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1. Introduction 
Steam generators in the second generation nuclear power plants with pressurized water and 
CANDU reactors were in most cases of the shell-and-tube type. The reactor coolant passes 
through the tubes at the primary side and boils water on the outside of the tubes (secondary 
shell side) to make steam.  
Typical dimensions of the tubes are the diameter of about one inch or less and the tube wall 
thickness of about 1 mm. A few thousand tubes with shape of inverted letter U were 
installed in a typical steam generator. The dominant choice of material was Ni-Cr-Fe alloy 
Inconel 600. After some years of operation the first degradations were detected. 
Degradations were caused by a variety of mechanisms and were not limited to Inconel 600. 
A good review of designs, materials and degradation mechanisms was given in (Shah and 
MacDonald 1993). 
Replacements of steam generators solved the degradation problem mainly by the choice of 
different tubing material (IAEA 2008). A large number of original steam generators are still 
in operation and some of them may operate without replacement until the final shutdown of 
the plants. Consequently, the degradation of the steam generator tubes is still in the focus of 
research and maintenance activities. Recent examples include (Lee, Park et al. 2010), 
(Revankar, Wolf et al. 2009), (Hur, Choi et al. 2010), (Pagan, Duan et al. 2009) and (Pandey, 
Datla et al. 2009). 
Our main purpose is a critical compilation of the past work in the field of probabilistic 
assessment of steam generator degradation and maintenance strategies. The probabilistic 
apparatus already proposed to serve in specific cases has been consolidated and generalized 
to accommodate a wide range of mechanistic and empirical models describing the tube 
failure modes.  
1.1 Safety consequences of degradations 
Steam generator tubes are exposed to thermal and mechanical loads combined with 
aggressive environmental conditions. Rather severe corrosion damage resulting in through 
wall flaws has been, among others, reported in tubes made of Inconel 600 (Shah and 
MacDonald 1993). 
Through-wall flaws in ductile pressurized components may at appropriate conditions lead 
to detectable leaks long before the structural integrity of the component is challenged. 
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Through-wall leaks should in most cases be interpreted as a reliable call for a corrective 
action (repair or replacement). However, in some specific cases continued operation with 
controlled leaks within the safety, legal, economical or other constraints might be acceptable.  
The Inconel 600 mill annealed (MA) steam generator tubes in pressurized water reactors 
may serve as a good example of allowable continued operation with limited leakage. The 
tubes confine radioactivity from neutron activation or fission products to the primary 
coolant during normal operation. However, the primary reactor coolant is at a higher 
pressure than the secondary coolant, so any leakage through defects in the tubes is from the 
primary to the secondary side, and rupture of the steam generator tubing can result in 
release of radioactivity to the environment outside the reactor containment through the 
pressure relief valves in the secondary system.  
Steam generator tubing represents a large part of the reactor coolant pressure boundary, 
which represents the second of three consecutive safety barriers preventing the release of 
the radioactive materials to the environment. The integrity of the reactor coolant boundary 
and therefore also of the steam generator tubes is therefore considered a paramount safety 
goal (Murphy 2007). Two potential failure modes of the tubes have received special 
attention (IAEA 1997): 
i. single or multiple tube rupture and 
ii. excessive primary-to-secondary leakage without tube rupture. 
A sufficient safety margin against tube rupture used to be the basis for a variety of 
maintenance strategies, which were developed to maintain a suitable level of plant safety 
and reliability (see (Shah and MacDonald 1993) for more details). This topic will not be 
pursued further here. It will merely be noted that some of the maintenance strategies 
justified sufficient margin also for the tubes with through-wall flaws. Consequently, several 
through-wall flaws may remain in operation and potentially contribute to the total primary-
to-secondary leak rate. Cases with up to 2000 flaws within a single steam generator have 
been reported to operate successfully (Cuvelliez and Roussel 1995).  
1.2 Inspection and repair strategies 
Traditionally, the steam generators were declared operable following a successful 
completion of the surveillance program. The surveillance program required periodic tube 
inspections. The inspection of tubes was typically performed using eddy current probes in 
intervals between 12 and 40 months. The required sample of the inspection depended on the 
number of defects found and ranged from 3 to 100% of the tubes. The tubes with damage 
exceeding the repair criteria, typically 40% reduction in the tube wall thickness, were 
required to be repaired (Murphy 2007). Repair typically included plugging or sleeving of the 
tube (Shah and MacDonald 1993). The aim was to preserve the integrity of the tube, both in 
terms of appropriate margins against tube rupture and leakage in normal and anticipated 
accidental conditions. 
Significant degradation problems could result in increasing number of plugged tubes that 
could severely reduce the performance of the steam generators. At the same time, the eddy 
current errors and defect growth rates sometimes exceeded those allowed by the tube repair 
criteria. This motivated the regulators to move towards performance based requirements to 
ensure the integrity of the steam generators. These allowed for the use of defect specific 
inspection and repair strategies, which were supported by experimental and analytical 
findings. Probabilistic assessment became a frequent part of the analytical efforts to quantify 
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the success of inspection and repair strategies in terms of tube failure probability. The 
probabilistic assessment techniques are discussed in detail in the following sections. The 
overview of the performance based requirements in USA is given in (Murphy 2007). 
1.3 Outline of this chapter 
Section 2 (Probabilistic modelling) outlines the consolidated and generalized probabilistic 
apparatus already proposed to serve in specific cases and generalized in this section to 
accommodate a wide range of mechanistic and empirical models describing the tube 
failure modes. Section 3 (Numerical examples) provides illustrative and practical 
examples demonstrating and illustrating the performance of the generalized probabilistic 
apparatus. Section 4 (Information content of successful sampling inspections) investigates 
the inspection situation typical for replacement steam generators,  where the inspection of 
a small random sample selected from all tubes reveals no defects. The probability of 
having certain number of defective tubes in the uninspected part of steam generator is 
discussed. 
2. Probabilistic modelling 
2.1 Basic assumptions 
The following basic assumptions are used in the sections below: 
• the defect size as measured by the non-destructive examination technique can be used 
to describe failure behaviour. 
• The reliability and sizing accuracy of the non-destructive examination technique can be 
quantified. 
• The repair of the defects with measured size exceeding allowable size is perfect. In 
other words, repair restores the virgin state of the tube or removes the tube from 
operation. 
• There is a potential to predict the growth of the degradation in the period until the next 
inspection. 
• There is exactly one crack per tube. 
• The parameters governing the tube failure are statistically independent.  
2.2 Failure integral 
Let us assume that the failure behaviour of the damaged tube can be described using n 
random variables ݔԦ ൌ ሺݔଵ, … , ݔ௡ሻ and a failure function ݃ሺݔԦሻ. Further, let the failure function 
be defined so that ݃ሺݔԦሻ ൏ Ͳ indicates the failure of the damaged tube. The probability of 
failure Pf of the population of tubes is then defined as (Madsen and Krenk 1986): 
௙ܲ ൌ න ݂ሺݔԦሻ ݀௚ሺ௫Ԧሻ ழ ଴ ݔԦ  (1)  
Now, the probability that j tubes will fail within a steam generator with total of N tubes may 
be estimated using: 
݌ሺ݆ሻ ൌ ൫ܰ ௙ܲ൯௝݆! ݁ିே ௉೑  (2)
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The probabilities that one or more tubes will fail are therefore given as: ܲሺ݆ ൌ ͳሻ ൌ ܰ ௙ܲ ݁ିே ௉೑ (3) ܲሺ݆ ൒ ͳሻ ൌ ͳ െ ݁ିே ௉೑ (4) 
2.3 Examples of failure functions 
Examples of failure functions given in this section are based on specific types of defects 
found in steam generator tubes with respective defect specific maintenance strategies: 
• Axial cracks in tube expansion transitions just above the tube sheet. The cracking 
resulted from primary water stress corrosion (cracks initiated at the tube inner surface) 
driven by substantial residual stresses in expansion transition zones (Fig. 1.). Only the 
tube rupture was considered as possible failure mode here. Special inspection 
techniques were developed to reliably and accurately measure the crack length. The 
tubes with measured crack length exceeding predefined repair limit were repaired. The 
leaks through safely short cracks were experimentally determined to be rather 
insignificant and also easily detectable (Esteban, Bolaños et al. 1990; Flesch and Cochet 
1990). 
• Outside diameter stress corrosion cracking under the tube support plates. The widely 
accepted root cause were aggressive impurities, which accumulated in the crevices 
between the tubes and tube support plates. These caused rather large network of 
intergranular cracks initiated at the outside tube surface. Some of the damaged tubes 
were pulled from the steam generators and served to establish empirical correlations 
between the defect size indicated by the inspection equipment on one side and the burst 
pressure and leak rate on the other side (see for example (Dvoršek, Cizelj et al. 1998) 
and the references therein).  
Further examples of models, which may be used in the definition of the failure function for 
various degradation processes have been proposed in the literature. Recent examples 
include for example (Revankar and Riznic 2009), (Kim, Oh et al. 2010), (Hui and Li 2010), 
(Kim, Jin et al. 2008) and (Hwang, Namgung et al. 2008). 
2.3.1 Axial cracks in expansion transition zones: tube rupture 
Primary water stress corrosion cracking was one of the first degradation mechanisms which 
were tackled by the defect specific inspection and repair strategy (Hernalsteen 1993). In 
most cases it resulted in axial cracks, mainly driven by the residual stresses caused by the 
expansion process during the manufacturing of the steam generators.  
Consider a long pressurized tube which is fixed into a drilled tubesheet by the means of 
expansion (Fig. 1.). The tube contains an axial through wall crack with length 2a. The failure 
mode of concern is the unstable (ductile) propagation of the crack leading to tube rupture.  
Leak through the tube is not the concern. Nevertheless, the reader is referred to (Revankar, 
Wolf et al. 2009) for a recent review of available leak rate models through cracks in steam 
generator tubing. 
The nuclear steam generator tubes are typically made of ductile Ni based alloys. A limit 
load model may therefore be appropriate: ݃ሺݔԦሻ ൌ ߪ௙ െ ݉ி ߪథ (5) 
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bulging factor (Erdogan 1976): ݉ி ൌ Ͳ.6ͳͶ ൅ Ͳ.͵86 ݁ିଶ.ଶହ ௔√ோ ௧ ൅ Ͳ.866 ܽ√ܴ ݐ (6)
a represents the crack half length at the end of inspection cycle. R and t are the mean radius 
of the tube (ܴ௢௨௧ െ ݐ ʹ⁄ ) and the tube wall thickness. The bulging factor essentially accounts 
for bending stresses at the crack lips, which bulge towards shape similar to fish mouth with 
increasing pressure or crack length. 
 
 
Fig. 1. A tube expanded into a tube sheet: expansion transition zone 
The flow stress  ߪ௙ is defined by the yield strength ߪ௬  and ultimate tensile stress ߪெ of tube 
material and may be adjusted for operating temperature (ߜ்), if the ߪ௬ and ߪெ were obtained 
at a different temperature: ߪ௙ ൌ κ ൫ߪ௬ ൅ ߪெ൯ ߜ் (7)κ is an experimentally determined constant which describes the degree of strain hardening 
behaviour of the tube material. Typical value for ductile metals in question is about 0.5. The 
hoop stress  ߪథ represents the crack driving membrane stress perpendicular to the direction 
of the crack, which is governed by the pressure difference Δ݌: ߪథ ൌ Δ݌ ൬ ܴݐ െ ͳʹ൰ (8)
Numerical values of the random variables indicated in eqs. (5) to (8) are detailed in Table 1. 
2.3.2 ODSCC under tube support plates: tube rupture 
The ODSCC under tube support plates resulted in complex networks of integranular cracks. 
The characterization of the crack networks by the non-destructive examination was not 
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sufficient to support a mechanistic model of stable and unstable crack growth. The failure 
assessment was therefore based on an empirical relation between the defect size as 
measured by the non-destructive examination method and the experimentally determined 
tube rupture pressures (EPRI 1993).  
The failure function for the evaluation of failure probabilities was formulated as (Dvoršek, 
Cizelj et al. 1998): ݃൫∆݌, ∆݌௙, ܽ൯ ൌ Δ݌ െ Δ݌௙ሺܽሻ (9)Δ݌ represents the loading expressed as the pressure difference across the tube wall. The 
highest pressure differences in the PWR NPP are typically caused by the accidents involving 
loss of secondary coolant system. The Δ݌௙ሺܽሻ denotes the burst pressure of the tube 
containing a defect of size a. This is given by an empirical relation (EPRI 1993) as : Δ݌௙ሺܽሻ ൌ ܣ ൅ ܤ · logଵ଴ሺܽሻ ൅ ߝ (10)
A and B are proprietary coefficients obtained by regression analysis of tube burst pressures 
measured on degraded tubes pulled from operating steam generators (EPRI 1993). At 
present, they are assumed constant. ߝ models the random error of the regression model.  
The defect size is the direct reading from the measurement by the appropriately calibrated 
bobbin coil probes (eddy current technique). The result of the inspection, which is assumed 
to indicate the defect size, is the amplitude of the signal (measured in Volts) obtained from 
the bobbin coil. As a very general reference, the signal amplitude indicates the volume of the 
lost material in the sense that its value depends on the crack length, crack depth and crack 
opening. 
2.3.3 ODSCC under tube support plates: excessive leakage 
The extent and complex morphology of the ODSCC also required verification that the 
leaking through all defects will remain within statutory limitations. The assessment of the 
leakage was again based on an empirical relation between the defect size as measured by the 
non-destructive examination method and the experimentally determined leak rates at 
assumed fixed pressure differences (EPRI 1993). The failure function was formulated by 
(Cizelj, Hauer et al. 1998) and (Cizelj and Roussel 2003): ݃ሺܳெ஺௑, ்ܳሻ ൌ ܳெ஺௑ െ ்ܳ  (11) ܳெ஺௑represents the statutory leak rate limit which is not to be exceeded during all design 
basis events. ்ܳ is the total leak rate through all n defects: 
்ܳ ൌ ෍ ܳ௜ሺܽ௜ሻ ൌ௡௜ ෍ܳ௜ሺܽ௜ሻ|௉೔வ଴ ൅ ෍ܳ௝൫ ௝ܽ൯ห௉ೕୀ଴௡ି௟௝ୀଵ௟௜  (12)
The leak rates through the individual defects ܳ௜ሺܽ௜ሻ depend on the defect size ܽ௜ and 
operational parameters: ܳ௜ሺܽ௜ሻ ൌ ቊܳሺܽ௜ , Δ݌, ܶ, … ሻ, ௜ܲሺܽ௜ሻ ൐ ͲͲ, ௜ܲሺܽ௜ሻ ൌ Ͳ (13)
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The operational parameters (pressure difference Δ݌, temperature T etc.) are for simplicity 
assumed constant over all defects considered. The individual leak rates are defined as an 
empirical function (EPRI 1993): logሺܳ௜ሻ ൌ ܾ଴ ൅ ܾଵ · logሺܽ௜ሻ ൅ ߝ (14)ܾ଴ and ܾଵ are proprietary coefficients obtained by regression analysis of tube leaks measured 
on degraded tubes pulled from operating steam generators (EPRI 1993). At present, they are 
assumed constant. ߝ models the random error of the regression model. The probability that a 
particular defect of size ܽ௜ is leaking is also given by an empirical function (EPRI 1993): ܲሺܽ௜ሻ ൌ ͳͳ െ expሾെሺߟ଴ ൅ ߟଵ · logሺܽ௜ሻሻ ൅ ݖ · ߪ௡ሿ (15)ߟ଴, ߟଵ and ݖ · ߪ௡ are proprietary coefficients obtained by regression analysis of tube leaks 
measured on degraded tubes pulled from operating steam generators (EPRI 1993). ݖ · ߪ௡ 
models the random error of the regression model. Recent research may enable future use of 
more mechanistic leak rate models (Hwang, Kim et al. 2005). 
2.4 Size of the defects 
In the field situations the information about the defect sizes comes from non-destructive 
examinations. It is therefore reasonable to reconstruct the distribution of actual defect sizes 
from the measured data. In this attempt, we assume a joint probability density of measured 
(m) and actual defect sizes (a) denoted by ݌஺,ெሺܽ, ݉ሻ. The density of measured defect sizes ݌ெሺ݉ሻ is then given by (Barnier, Pitner et al. 1992): 
݌ெሺ݉ሻ ൌ න ݌ெ|஺ሺ݉|ܽሻஶ଴ ݌஺ሺܽሻ ݀ܽ (16)
Please note that the Bayes’ theorem requires that ݌஺,ெሺܽ, ݉ሻ ൌ ݌ெ|஺ሺ݉|ܽሻ ݌஺ሺܽሻ, ݌ெሺ݉ሻ ൌ ׬ ݌஺,ெሺܽ, ݉ሻஶ଴ ݀ܽ  and ݌ெሺܽሻ ൌ ׬ ݌஺,ெሺܽ, ݉ሻஶ଴ ݀݉ (17) 
Further, we may safely assume that not all defects are detected during the inspection. Let 
the probability that a defect of actual size a is detected be denoted as  ைܲ஽ሺܽሻ. Then, the 
conditional probability density ݌஺| ஽ሺܽሻ that a defect of size a is detected is given as: ݌஺| ஽ሺܽሻ ൌ ݌஺ሺܽሻ ைܲ஽ሺܽሻ׬ ݌஺ሺܽ́ሻ ைܲ஽ሺܽ́ሻ ݀ܽ́ஶ଴  (18)
Equation (5) may now be combined with eq. (16) to yield: 
݌ெሺ݉ሻ ൌ ׬ ݌ெ|஺ሺ݉|ܽሻஶ଴ ݌஺ሺܽሻ ைܲ஽ሺܽሻ݀ܽ׬ ݌஺ሺܽ́ሻ ைܲ஽ሺܽ́ሻ݀ܽ́ஶ଴  (19)
Distribution of ݌஺ሺܽሻ may be estimated by inverting eq. (16). A useful numerical procedure 
has been proposed by (Barnier, Pitner et al. 1992). It requires a selection of functional form of 
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of ݌஺ሺܽሻ. These can be determined by fitting the calculated values of ݌ெሺ݉ሻ to the empirical 
distribution of measured defect sizes by using for example minimization of ߯ଶ.  
2.5 Repair of the defects 
Typically, the defects exceeding certain size, denoted repair limit L, need to be repaired. The 
defect of size a will therefore exceed the repair limit with probability: 
௅ܲሺܽሻ ൌ ͳߟ ைܲ஽ሺܽሻ න ݌ெ|஺ሺ݉|ܽሻஶ௅ ݀݉ ሺͳ െ ߝ௅ሻ (20)
1/η represents the fraction of inspected tubes. A residual repair unreliability ǆL is provided 
to account for rare events like human error. The fraction of repaired defects is then given as: 
න ݌஺ሺܽሻஶ଴ ௅ܲሺܽሻ݀ܽ  (21)
Similarly, the probability that a defect of size a will not be repaired is given by: ݌஺ሺܽሻ൫ͳ െ ௅ܲሺܽሻ൯ (22)
2.6 Growth of the defects 
The growth of the defects can be rather efficiently estimated from the successive inspections. 
A careful statistical analysis of inspection records may also provide a reasonable indication 
of measurement errors (Cizelj and Dvoršek 1999). The obvious drawback of such an 
approach is the need to rely entirely on historic data and operational conditions already 
observed. Since this approach is rather straightforward, it is not pursued further here. 
Mechanistic models of crack growth, if available, may provide predictions for a wide range 
of operational conditions. As an example, the asymmetric crack growth law proposed for 
axial stress corrosion cracks in expansion transitions of steam generator tubes (Cizelj, Mavko 
et al. 1995) is given below. 
The growth rate of a stress corrosion crack is given as (Cizelj, Mavko et al. 1995):  ሶܽേ௔ ൌ ൬݀ܽ݀ݐ ൰േ௔ ൌ ܥേ௔ሺܭേ௔ െ ܭூௌ஼஼ሻ௠ (23)
Please note that the crack growth rate is different for both crack tips (േܽ, Fig. 2). The growth 
of the crack is accompanied by the moving center point, as indicated in Fig. 2. The stress 
intensity factors ܭേ௔ are to be estimated from the quite irregular stress field indicated in Fig. 
2. A rather simple procedure for stress calculations appropriate for reliability calculations is 
proposed in (Cizelj 1994). Material properties ܥേ௔, ܭூௌ஼஼ and m are taken from literature 
(Scott 1991) and detailed in Table 2. The proportionality constant ܥേ௔ is reported to be about 
6 times higher in cold worked than in virgin material (Cassagne, Combrade et al. 1992). 
The operational and residual stresses in are, together with stress intensity factors of both 
crack tips ܭേ௔, analysed in detail in (Cizelj 1994). 
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Fig. 2. Residual hoop stress in an expanded tube and asymmetric crack propagation. 
Reprinted from International Journal of Pressure Vessels and Piping, Vol. 63, L. Cizelj, B. 
Mavko, H. Riesch-Oppermann, A. Brücker-Foit, Propagation of stress corrosion cracks in 
steam generator tubes, p. 35, Copyrigt (1995), with permission from Elsevier 
2.7 Numerical solutions of the failure integral 
The basic numerical methods implemented to evaluate the numerical examples are briefly 
outlined in this section for completeness. These are the direct Monte Carlo (DMC) 
simulation and the First- and Second Order Reliability Methods (FORM and SORM). The 
reader is referred for example to (Madsen and Krenk 1986) for a more rigorous description. 
Other numerical methods have been proposed in addition to the DMC, FORM and SORM 
and are implemented in computational tools such as for example ZERBERUS (Cizelj and 
Riesch-Oppermann 1992), COMPROMIS (Pitner, Riffard et al. 1993), PFMAD (Beardsmore, 
Stone et al. 2010), PROBAN (Det Norske Veritas 2010) and ANL/CANTIA (Revankar, Wolf 
et al. 2009). Some of them also include useful fracture mechanics models. 
Direct Monte Carlo corresponds to a sequence of numerical experiments. The failure 
function in eq. (1) is evaluated for n realisations of the random vector ݔԦ. Let nf denote the 
number of realisations with ݃ሺݔԦሻ ൏ Ͳ. The estimator of the Pf is then given as: 
௙ܲ ൌ ݊௙݊ (24)
The standard error of the estimator in eq. (24) is given as: 
ݏ ൌ ඨ ௙ܲ൫ͳ െ ௙ܲ൯݊  (25)
Large number of repeated evaluations of failure function may be required for a reasonably 
small standard error. Less computationally intensive methods are available when dealing 
with complex failure functions that may only be evaluated using significant computational 
resources. Such methods on the one hand include Monte Carlo methods with variance 
 
L
dL
+a-a
da-a da+a
da = 0.5 (da+a + da-a)
dL = 0.5 (da+a - da-a)
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reduction sampling, such as for example latin hypercube sampling. On the other hand, 
approximate methods such as First- and Second Order Reliability Method (FORM and SORM, 
respectively) may offer reasonably accurate results with low computational intensity. 
The First Order Reliability Methods (FORM) relies on the closed form solution of the failure 
integral in the case of standard normal variables and linear failure function, given as: 
௙ܲ ൌ Φሺെߚሻ (26)Φ being the cumulative standard normal distribution  and β the reliability index: ߚ ൌ ݃௨ሺݑሬԦכሻ െ Ԧܽ · ݑሬԦכ| Ԧܽ|  (27)
Reliability index is the minimum distance between the origin of space of standard normal 
variables and the failure surface. The point on the failure surface with the minimum 
distance to the origin is called the design point ݑሬԦכ. Please note that Ԧܽ ൌ grad൫݃௨ሺݑሬԦכሻ൯. 
For non-linear failure functions, the linearization of the failure function in the design point 
provides an approximate value of the failure probability: 
௙ܲ ൎ Φሺെߚሻ (28)
The non-normal basic variables are to be transformed from the physical  ݔԦ to the normal ݑሬԦ 
space. The transformation of stochastically independent basic variables is given as 
௜ܷ ൌ Φିଵሺܨ௜ሺ ௜ܺሻሻ (29)
Its inverse is defined as: 
௜ܺ ൌ ܨିଵሺΦሺ ௜ܷሻሻ (30)
The inverse transformation (eq. (31)) is also used to transform the failure function. The 
sensitivity of the failure probability to the scatter of basic variables is expressed as: ߲ߚ߲ݑ௜ ൌ ݑ௜כ|ݑሬԦ| (31)
The Second Order Reliability Method (SORM) may improve the accuracy of the FORM by 
approximating the failure function in the design point by a quadratic hypersurface, which 
preserves the main curvatures ߢ௜ of the failure function. The failure probability is given: 
௙ܲ ൎ ଵܵ ൅ ܵଶ ൅ ܵଷ  (32)
ଵܵ ൌ Φሺെߚሻ ෑሺͳ െ ߚ ߢ௜ሻି଴.ହ௡ିଵ௜ୀଵ  (33)
ܵଶ ൌ ሾβΦሺെߚሻ െ ߮ሺߚሻሿ ൥ෑሺͳ െ ߚ ߢ௜ሻି଴.ହ௡ିଵ௜ୀଵ െ ෑሺͳ െ ሺߚ ൅ ͳሻ ߢ௜ሻି଴.ହ௡ିଵ௜ୀଵ ൩  (34)
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ܵଷ ൌ ሺߚ ൅ ͳሻሾβΦሺെߚሻ െ ߮ሺߚሻሿ ൥ෑሺͳ െ ߚ ߢ௜ሻି଴.ହ௡ିଵ௜ୀଵ െ Re ൭ෑሺͳ െ ሺߚ ൅ iሻ ߢ௜ሻି଴.ହ௡ିଵ௜ୀଵ ൱൩ (35) 
Re represents the real part of the complex argument and i the imaginary unit. ߮ is standard 
normal probability density function. The applicability and reasonable accuracy of FORM 
and SORM in the reliability analyses of the cracked steam generator tubing has been 
confirmed in (Cizelj, Mavko et al. 1994). 
3. Numerical examples 
Three numerical examples are provided to illustrate the results obtained using the 
probabilistic model outlined in section 2. All three numerical examples are based on the data 
obtained from regular inspections of steam generators in operating nuclear power plants at 
Krško, Slovenia and Doel, Belgium. All nuclear power plants mentioned in the examples 
have already replaced the steam generators.  
3.1 Axial SCC in expansion transitions 
This numerical example is based on the crack population detected in the nuclear power 
plant at Krško, Slovenia. The data on the geometry and material of the tubing is outlined, 
together with assumed distributions, in Table 1. The pressure difference ∆݌ acting on the 
steam generator tubes corresponds to the maximal pressure difference mentioned in the 
plant safety analysis report and is representative for a limiting hypothetical accident 
“feedwater line break”. The failure probabilities reported in this section are therefore 
conditional given that the feedwater line break has already occurred.  
The distribution of actual crack lengths was described using the lognormal distribution with 
shape and scale parameters of 0.532 and 1.627, respectively. This was obtained using the 
measured crack length distribution (Krško SG #1, 1992, (Cizelj 1994)) and the procedure 
outlined in eqs. (16) through (19). Random measurement error with normal distribution with 0 
mean and standard deviation of 0.75 mm and detection probability ைܲ஽ሺܽሻ ൌ ሺͳ െ ݁ି଴.ଽ ௔ሻ ሺͳ െߝܱܦ were assumed. Possible systematic errors were not considered in this analysis. The 
residual non-detection and non-repair probabilities were assumed at ߝை஽ ൌ ߝ௅ ൌ ͳͲିସ. 
All results presented in this section were obtained using the FORM and SORM as 
implemented in the code ZERBERUS (Cizelj and Riesch-Oppermann 1992). The stochastic 
parameters of the crack growth law (eq. (23)) are given in Table 2. 
 
Basic 
variable 
Distribution 
Unit 
Type Parameters 
Rout normal μ=9.525, σ=0.0254 mm 
t normal μ=1.0922, σ=0.039 mm 
κ normal μ=0.545, σ=0.03 - 
ǅT normal μ=0.928, σ=0.003 - 
σY normal μ=362., σ=34. MPa 
σM normal μ=713., σ=25. MPa 
Table 1. Geometry and material data (Krško steam generator No. 1) 
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The resulting failure probabilities at different repair limits and time intervals between 
consecutive inspections are depicted in Fig. 3. The repair assumes that the detected cracks 
with measured lengths exceeding the repair limit are repaired. Beneficial effects of lower 
repair limit and shorter time between inspections are clearly shown. The plateau of all four 
curves below repair limit of approximately 13 mm is caused by the residual non-detection 
and non-repair limits  ߝை஽ ൌ ߝ௅ ൌ ͳͲିସ. 
An optimal repair limit is however clearly noted and varies from about 11 mm (15 months 
between inspections) and 13 mm (6 months between inspections). In the particular case 
studied, the gain of more frequent inspections may be seen as rather insignificant. 
 
Basic 
variable 
Distribution 
Unit Comments 
Type Parameters 
C-a normal μ=2.8⋅10-11, σ=1.0⋅10-12 m/s Assumed 
KISCC normal μ=9.0, σ=0.3 MPa m½ Assumed 
m normal μ=1.16, σ=0.03 - Assumed 
Table 2. Values of crack growth parameters in eq. (23)  
The variables with the strongest influence on the failure probability are the exponent m in the 
crack growth law (eq. (23)), the wall thickness of the tube t and the flow stress factor κ (eq. (7)).  
 
 
Fig. 3. Probability of failure Pf as a function of repair limit L and time between two 
consecutive inspections. Reprinted from Journal of pressure vessel technology, Vol. 118, L. 
Cizelj, B. Mavko, and P. Vencelj, Reliability of steam generator tubes with axial cracks,  
p. 441, Copyrigt (1996), with permission from ASME 
The dependence of the failure probability on the number of repaired cracked tubes is 
depicted in Fig. 4. Please note that the failure probability is interpreted as probability of tube 
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failure (eq. (4)). 841 cracks were detected in the SG #1 in Krško NPP in 1992. The probability 
of tube failure is constant for repair limits below approximately 12 mm. At the same time, 
the number of cracks to be repaired (tubes to be plugged) is increasing very fast with 
decreased repair limit. The repair limit of 12 mm is therefore seen as an optimal choice 
preserving the most tubes in operation without sacrificing reliability and safety of the plant.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Failure probability and the number of repaired tubes 
The success of the traditional defect depth repair limit (40% loss of tube wall) is indicated 
assuming a poor correlation between the measurements of defect depth and defect length. 
The traditional repair strategy could therefore result in a moderate number of repaired tubes 
at the cost of a certain steam generator tube rupture following the feedwater line break.  
3.2 Tube burst due to the ODSCC at tube support plates 
Defect sizes as obtained from 5 consecutive (100%) bobbin coil inspections of one steam 
generator at the Krško NPP are shown in Fig. 5. The distributions remained fairly stable 
over the years in all cases analysed in this section. The tail of the measured sizes obtained 
during In-Service Inspection (ISI) 5 is getting fat as compared to the older data. The 
lognormal distribution was considered to provide reasonable fit (Dvoršek, Cizelj et al. 1998).  
We should note here that the number of defect sizes detected has grown from 261 in the first 
to over 2000 in the last inspection. Although the change in the number of tubes does not 
directly influence the calculation of failure probability (eq. (1)), it significantly influences the 
single SGTR probability (eq. (2)). 
Distributions of defect growth depicted in Fig. 6 were obtained directly from each pair of 
two consecutive measurements available. The number of available data points grew from 80 
in the first inspection to over 1300 in the last. Reasonably stable distribution of positive 
growth was observed over all years, tending to get a more fat distribution tail in ISI 5.  
Repair limit L [mm]
Cracks are repaired by 
plugging the cracked tubes. 
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Fig. 7. Failure probabilities with time and different assumptions on measurement errors and 
defect growth 
To estimate the tube rupture probability a postulated Feedwater Line Break (FLB) accident 
was assumed with differential pressure of 195.6 bar (2850 psi). 
In this section we present the single tube rupture probabilities. The estimated probability of 
multiple tube rupture was in all cases at least two orders of magnitude lower than for the 
single tube rupture probability. Thus, the multiple tube rupture event was not considered to 
be of particular importance at this time. 
The absolute values of the single tube rupture probabilities are depicted in Fig. 7 as a 
function of time. In addition, impact of different assumptions on the defect sizes and defect 
growth on the single tube rupture probability is given, exhibiting a considerable impact of 
about one order of magnitude. All of them are however depicted without tube repair. It is 
clear from Fig. 7 that all of the tube rupture probabilities except in the year 5 were estimated 
to be less than 1%, which is in agreement with U.S. NRC requirements [10] (Nuclear 
Regulatory Commission 1995). In the year 5, a repair of a moderate number of tubes would 
be required to stay below 1%.  
The estimated single tube rupture probabilities are conditional, given a postulated FLB 
accident. 
3.3 Leakage through ODSCC at tube support plates 
Two numerical examples were chosen to illustrate the performance of the proposed 
probabilistic approach. They are based on the inspection data obtained from Slovenian 
Krško and Belgian Doel-4 steam generator tubes (3/4 inch tubes made of Inconel 600 Mill 
Annealed) in (Cizelj and Roussel 2003).  
In operation, the defect size is generally a time dependent variable. In this analysis, two 
points in time are of concern and fully define the defect size: (1) beginning (BOC) and (2) 
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end (EOC) of the cycle between two consecutive inspections. Thus, the prediction of the 
EOC defects sizes includes stochastic combination of BOC defect sizes and defect growth. 
The distribution of defect sizes in the Krško plant at the BOC is given in Fig. 8. In the 
calculations, empirical and fitted lognormal distributions of defect sizes at BOC were used. 
The differences between failure probabilities obtained with different defect size 
distributions were comparable to the statistical noise of the Monte Carlo simulation. 
Nevertheless, the empirical distribution consistently leads to higher values of the probability 
of exceeding the allowable leak rate and was therefore selected as representative input data 
model for subsequent analysis. The total number of defects detected was 492.  
Allowances for defect growth (with 52,6 % of defects exhibiting nonnegative growth, compare 
Fig. 6) and measurement errors were also provided and yielded the defect size at EOC. 
Fig. 9 depicts probability of excessive leakage as a function of allowable total leak rate. Three 
different curves are given to illustrate the effect of defect progression: BOC (no defect 
progression), EOC with 52,6% of defects exhibiting growth (which is consistent with field 
observations in Krško) and EOC with 100% of defects exhibiting growth. The Krško specific 
growth rate is used in the analysis and is shown to contribute less than one order of 
magnitude. 
 
 
Fig. 8. Distribution of BOC defect sizes-Krško plant. Reprinted from Nuclear Engineering 
and Design, Vol. 185, L. Cizelj, I. Hauer, G. Roussel, C. Cuvelliez, Probabilistic assessment of 
excessive leakage through steam generator tubes degraded by secondary side corrosion, p. 
347, Copyrigt (1998), with permission from Elsevier 
The statistical standard error of Monte Carlo simulations is represented by error bars in Fig. 
9. It is in the order of 0.1% and is considered to have negligible influence on the quality of 
results presented here. Further, simulations revealed that only about 5 (1%) out of 492 
potential leakers would really leak given assumed model (recall eqs. (13) and (15)) and 
postulated hypothetical accidental conditions - steam line break.  
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Fig. 9. Probability of Exceeding Allowable Leak Rates - Krško plant. Reprinted from Nuclear 
Engineering and Design, Vol. 185, L. Cizelj, I. Hauer, G. Roussel, C. Cuvelliez, Probabilistic 
assessment of excessive leakage through steam generator tubes degraded by secondary side 
corrosion, p. 347, Copyrigt (1998), with permission from Elsevier 
The labels AVN#1, AVN#2 and EPRI denote empirical estimators aiming to predict the 
value of the total leak rate at or exceeding the cumulative probability of 95%. The AVN#1 
and AVN#2 estimators were proposed in (Cuvelliez and Roussel 1995) as alternatives to the 
proposal by EPRI (EPRI 1993). The properties of all three estimators are analyzed in detail in 
(Cizelj, Hauer et al. 1998). For the purpose of this section, they are considered as empirical 
estimators of the 5% failure probability and are used to validate the probabilistic results. 
The results of the three estimators are visualized by vertical lines at appropriate values of 
total leak rates (Fig. 9). Thus, for EPRI estimator, the failure probability is defined by the 
intersection of curves denoted by EOC, 52,6% growth and EPRI (25 l/h). Its value is about 
3.5%. The AVN estimators #1 and #2 tend to 5 and 11%, respectively. 
The distribution of defect sizes from Belgian Doel-4 plant is given in Fig. 10. The number of 
defects detected is 1960 (significantly more than in Krško). The size of defects is rather large 
with a maximum of 18.9 V. It should be however noted that Belgian inspection standards 
differ from EPRI standards. Appropriate correlation between “Belgian” and “EPRI” bobbin 
coil signal amplitudes was implemented to generate input data. This may be an additional 
source of uncertainties, which was not further investigated (Cizelj and Roussel 2003).  
The presence of large defects is due to the use of a specific repair criterion allowing defects 
of about 10V to remain in service. The distribution of defects shown in Fig. 10 is the raw 
distribution as given by the bobbin coil. Also, a fit of lognormal distribution to the 
empirical distribution is depicted in Fig. 10. No defect progression was considered in the 
calculations. 
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The subpopulation of tube leakers in Fig. 10 illustrates the sample distribution of defects 
with ௜ܲሺܽ௜ሻ ൐ Ͳ (eq. (15)). The simulations revealed that approximately 330 (17%) defects 
would leak in this particular case. It is clearly shown in Fig. 10 that larger defects tend to 
leak more frequently, which is in accordance with eq. (15). 
 
 
Fig. 10. Distribution of BOC defect sizes - Doel-4 plant. Reprinted from Nuclear Engineering 
and Design, Vol. 185, L. Cizelj, I. Hauer, G. Roussel, C. Cuvelliez, Probabilistic assessment of 
excessive leakage through steam generator tubes degraded by secondary side corrosion,  
p. 347, Copyrigt (1998), with permission from Elsevier 
The probability of excessive leakage is depicted in Fig. 11 as a function of allowable total 
leak rate. Results obtained by two different input distributions of defect sizes are shown. 
The histogram of all defects shown in Fig. 10 served as the empirical distribution. On the 
other hand, the lognormal distribution was fitted to the raw inspection data. The rather 
large difference between both curves is caused by two facts: 
• lognormal distribution explicitly allows for rare events. In other words, it allows for 
occurrences of large defects, which exceed the measured maximum of 18.9 V. 
• the probability of leakage eq. (15) is approaching 1 as the defect size is approaching 20 
V. Thus, the uncertainties in the leak rate model are not dominant in this region which 
increases the sensitivity to the input data as compared to the Krško case.  
 
Again, the results of three estimators are comparatively depicted in Fig. 11. All of them rely 
on empirical distributions of the defect sizes, which suggests the comparison with 
probabilities of excessive leakage obtained from empirical distribution. The results of two 
estimators appear to be slightly conservative (EPRI 1.8%, AVN#1 3.5%) while AVN#2 tends 
to the expected 5%. On the other hand, if the lognormal distribution is used, EPRI estimator 
seems to be realistic (leading to failure probability of 6%) while the AVN estimators lead to 
failure probabilities exceeding 10% (AVN#1 11%, AVN#2 16%). 
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Fig. 11. Probability of exceeding allowable leak rates – Doel-4 plant. Reprinted from Nuclear 
Engineering and Design, Vol. 185, L. Cizelj, I. Hauer, G. Roussel, C. Cuvelliez, Probabilistic 
assessment of excessive leakage through steam generator tubes degraded by secondary side 
corrosion, p. 347, Copyrigt (1998), with permission from Elsevier 
4. Information content of successful sampling inspections 
In replaced steam generators, the in-service inspection may be performed within a rather 
limited sample of tubes. Since the main objective of the in-service inspection is to provide 
reasonable insurance of tubing integrity, the information gained about a limited sample of 
steam generator tubes must be used to make predictions about the entire population. 
The case where the inspection of a small sample selected randomly from the population of 
all tubes showed exactly zero defects is investigated in this section. In particular, the 
probability of having certain number of defective tubes in the finite population in the case of 
zero defects found is discussed. To this end, some closed-form solutions derived using the 
Bayesian probability theory in (Roussel and Cizelj 2007) are used. The main assumptions 
made in (Roussel and Cizelj 2007) were: 
1. all steam generators perform in a like manner; 
2. only one flaw may affect a steam generator tube; 
3. the samples are selected on a random basis; 
4. the probability of detection for  flaws with size larger than the detection threshold is 1. 
4.1 Basic relations 
Consider multiple N units of the same type. It is expected that there are a few defective units 
present. Before inspection, however, there is no known reason to distinguish between 
different units as far as their individual plausibility to be defective is concerned. 
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Random sampling of n units from the lot may be considered as a random drawing without 
replacement of n units. Put Sn the number of defective units in a random sample of size n. 
The case where n=N means that the sampling without replacement has been performed 
until all units have been drawn and hence SN is the number of defective units contained in 
the lot. 
In the case where the lot is known to include k defective tubes, the probability of l defective 
units among any random sample of size n follows the hypergeometric distribution and is 
given by 
ܲሺܵ௡ ൌ ݈| ܵே ൌ ݇ ሻ ൌ ݄ሺ݈, ݊, ݇, ܰሻ ൌ ൫௞௟ ൯൫ேି௞௡ି௟ ൯൫ே௡൯  (36)
In the case where the composition of the population is unknown, the probability of l 
defective tubes among any random sample of size n is given by the mixture of 
hypergeometric probabilities by application of the rule of total probabilities: 
ܲሺܵ௡ ൌ ݈ ሻ ൌ ෍ ܲሺܵ௡ ൌ ݈| ܵே ൌ ݇ ሻ ܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇ ሻ ൌேି௡ା௟௞ୀଵ ෍ ݄ሺ݈, ݊, ݇, ܰሻ ܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇ ሻேି௡ା௟௞ୀଵ   (37)
In the Bayesian approach, the prior belief about the probability of k is quantified by a 
probability distribution, the prior distribution of k, i.e., ܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇ ሻ. Data l are then collected, 
and the likelihood function ݄ሺ݈, ݊, ݇, ܰሻ is constructed. Finally, the posterior distribution ܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇| ܵ௡ ൌ ݈  ሻ is constructed, by combining the prior distribution ܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇ ሻ and the 
likelihood function ݄ሺ݈, ݊, ݇, ܰሻ: ܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇| ܵ௡ ൌ ݈ ሻ ൌ ܲሺܵ௡ ൌ ݈| ܵே ൌ ݇ ሻ ܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇ ሻܲሺ ܵ௡ ൌ ݈ ሻ  (38) 
And finaly, ܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇| ܵ௡ ൌ ݈ ሻ ൌ ݄ሺ݈, ݊, ݇, ܰሻܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇ ሻ∑ ݄ሺ݈, ݊, ݇Ԣ, ܰሻ ܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇Ԣ ሻேି௡ା௟௞ᇱୀଵ  (39)
The posterior distribution (eq. (39)) shows the updated belief about the values of the 
probability that accounts for the observed data. The summation in the denominator ensures 
that the right hand side of the equation is properly scaled. In any case, it is just a constant 
that is independent of the values of the parameter k. 
4.2 Prior and posterior distributions 
The choice of the prior distribution of defective tubes ܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇  ሻ is subjective. In the 
following, a few examples of prior distributions are discussed. They share a very useful 
feature: a closed-form posterior density.  
In absence of any information it may be useful to consider a non-informative uniform prior 
distribution: ܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇ ሻ ൌ ͳܰ ൅ ͳ Ͳ ൑ ݇ ൑ ܰ (40)
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This leads to the closed form posterior in the form of: ܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇| ܵ௡ ൌ Ͳ ሻ ൌ ͳ ൅ ݊ͳ ൅ ܰ ݄ሺͲ, ݊, ݇, ܰሻ (41) 
We may also assume that the number of defective tubes in the finite population follows the 
binomial distribution with expected number of defective tubes being pN: ܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇ ሻ ൌ ൬ܰ݇൰ ݌௞ሺͳ െ ݌ሻேି௞ Ͳ ൑ ݇ ൑ ܰ (42)
This in turn leads to the closed form posterior in the form of: ܲሺ ܵே ൌ ݇| ܵ௡ ൌ Ͳ ሻ ൌ ൬ܰ െ ݊݇ ൰ ݌௞ሺͳ െ ݌ሻேି௡ି௞ ݄ሺͲ, ݊, ݇, ܰሻ (43)
Further details on derivation and properties of the above posterior distributions are given in 
(Cizelj and Roussel 2003). 
4.3 Numerical example 
Predicting the results of measurements is the forward problem. The inverse problem 
consists of using the actual results of measurements to infer the values of the parameters 
that characterize the system. The main characteristic of the inverse problem is that it does 
not have a unique solution. Because of this, in the inverse problem, a priori information 
about the model parameters is needed. In this case, inferring the number of defective tubes 
in the whole population from the results of an inspection of a random sample is an inverse 
problem. In the probabilistic formulation of the inverse problem, a priori information about 
the probability distribution of the system parameters is needed. 
The choice of the particular prior in Bayesian analysis is usually interpreted as the 
knowledge or belief the analyst has about the investigated problem. Now, let us examine 
two rather extreme states of knowledge assumed by our imaginary analyst: 
1. The material and design improvements made in the replacement steam generators are 
believed to be so efficient that active degradation processes are extremely unlikely. At 
the same time it is acknowledged that rare events might occur. Our prior information 
about the condition of the tubes then appears described correctly with a binomial 
distribution associated with a low value of the probability p. 
2. On the other hand, we may acknowledge the material and design improvements made 
in the replacement steam generators. At the same time, we are convinced that the 
nature is more imaginative than the most experienced engineers. Then, our belief may 
well be that no knowledge about the condition of the tubes exists prior to the 
inspection. In such situation, the uniform distribution may appear to be a well-suited 
distribution. 
At the first glance, it might appear that the binomial distribution expresses more 
information about the actual proportion of defective tubes in the steam generators than the 
uniform distribution. However, comparing eqs. (42) and (43) reveals that the posterior in eq. 
(43) is identical to the prior (eq. (42)) we would have postulated for any subset of N-n tubes 
in the population. Otherwise stated, the data collected during the in-service inspection of the 
first sample (n) tells us nothing at all about the unsampled tubes (N-n). Indeed, the choice of 
a binomial prior introduces a strong belief that there is a limited and rather well 
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characterized subpopulation of defective tubes. Since we do not find any defective tubes 
during the inspection of the sample n, the entire defective subpopulation must have 
survived the inspection and remains in the uninspected set of the tubes.  
The explanation of the uniform prior requires numerical example. The steam generator 
contains N=10,000 tubes in all subsequent discussions. The definition of the relative sample 
size always refers to N. For example, a 10% sample would consist of n=1000 tubes. 
Let us reiterate that the choice of uniform prior introduces the a-priory belief that any 
number of defective tubes is equally probable. This results in the posterior density (eq. (41)) 
of the number of defective tubes left in uninspected tubes, given the random sample of size 
n revealed zero defective tubes. Posterior densities for selected inspection samples are 
plotted together with the prior density in Fig. 12. 
The non-informative uniform prior has a value of about 10-4, which is independent of the 
number of defective tubes in the steam generator. Now, assume that inspection of a small 
(0,5%) random sample has been performed without finding any defects. Our information 
about the uninspected tubes improved drastically: The probability of having small number 
of defects increased for about two orders of magnitude. At the same time, although not 
shown in Fig. 12, the probability of having large number of defects in the uninspected part 
of the steam generator also decreased significantly. The expected number of defective tubes, 
which was 5000 for the uniform prior, decreased to 191 (yellow dots in Fig. 12).  
Further increases in sample size are shown to increase the knowledge about the uninspected 
part of the population significantly. Inspecting the 20% random sample (without finding 
any defects) results in expected number of remaining defects at about 4 and in very fast 
decrease of probability of having larger numbers of defects. 
 
 
Fig. 12. Posteriors with different sample sizes. Uniform prior and 0 defects in the sample. 
Reprinted from Journal of pressure vessel technology, Vol. 129, Guy Roussel and Leon 
Cizelj, Propagation of stress corrosion cracks in steam generator tubes, p. 109, Copyrigt 
(1996), with permission from ASME 
Expected number of defective tubes in the uninspected part of the population is plotted as a 
function of the sample size in Fig. 13. In addition, the 90% and 99% confidence curves are 
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plotted based on the expected number of degraded tubes and its variance defined in (Cizelj 
and Roussel 2003). Without inspection, the expected number of defects is 5000. It diminishes 
fast with increasing inspection sample. 3% inspection is shown to give 90% confidence, that 
there are less than 80 defective tubes left undetected. Similarly, 20% inspection is shown to 
give 99% confidence, that there are fewer than 11 defective tubes left undetected. 
 
 
Fig. 13. Expected number of undetected defective tubes. Uniform prior and 0 defects in the 
sample. Reprinted from Journal of pressure vessel technology, Vol. 129, Guy Roussel and 
Leon Cizelj, Propagation of stress corrosion cracks in steam generator tubes, p. 109, Copyrigt 
(1996), with permission from ASME 
The confidence to be placed in the results of the sampling inspection therefore depends 
mainly on the knowledge about the defective tubes existing prior to the inspection. As a 
rough practical guide, sampling inspection will only improve our knowledge about the 
defective subpopulation if we had very poor or no knowledge about it prior to the 
inspection. The sampling inspection (with uniform prior) may therefore be trusted as long 
as no defects are detected. With first failures detected, however, other inspection approaches 
might give more reliable results. This will be one of the topics of future investigations. 
5. Summary 
A critical compilation of the past work in the field of probabilistic assessment of degradation 
and maintenance strategies for degraded steam generator tubes was performed. The 
probabilistic apparatus previously proposed to serve in specific cases has been consolidated 
and generalized to accommodate a wide range of mechanistic and empirical models 
describing the tube failure modes. Realistic numerical examples provided illustrative and 
practical demonstration of the generalized probabilistic apparatus. Results include tube 
rupture probabilities, excessive tube leakage probabilities and comparisons of different 
maintenance approaches in probabilistic terms.  
The basis for determining the size of the small random samples of tubes to be inspected in 
replacement steam generators is revisited. It is assumed that the probability of finding a 
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defective tube in a random sample is exceedingly small. A procedure to estimate the 
maximum number of defective tubes left in the steam generator after no defective tubes 
have been detected in the randomly selected inspection sample is proposed. 
The confidence to be placed in the results of the sampling inspection has been found to 
depend mainly on the knowledge about the defective tubes existing prior to the inspection. 
As a rough practical guide, sampling inspection will only improve our knowledge about the 
defective subpopulation if we had very poor or no knowledge about it prior to the 
inspection.  
The future work is expected to be focused mainly on the mechanistic models describing the 
rupture and leakage properties of various defects found in steam generator tubes. This will 
improve the predictive capabilities of the probabilistic framework described here.  
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